The revolution won't be...a thing: social media and its co-option of contemporary popular social movements

History has shown us how revolutions are carried out: on the streets, with organized militants fighting like they have nothing to lose. But that revolution is dead. Juxtaposed against this scene of fiery resistance are the popular movements of the 21st century; no more are the days of throwing bricks and dodging gun powders thrown by cop.s Instead, the battlefield is now a virtual space and people fight with their icons and hashtags. The emergence of social media paralleled the energetic renewal of political outrage from the younger generations. But now, these movements are co-opted from their inception by the hegemonic order they critique. In other words, it is social media as a space and tool that has transformed our understanding of what constitutes a revolution, as well as what we need to sacrifice for one. The question is not about whether social media has made it impossible to distinguish between a genuine popular movement and a manufactured one. Indeed, it has made it impossible for a movement to be genuine in the first place.

Social media, in this essay, will refer to “websites and mobile apps that enable users to network with each other and create and share content” (Zangger 2024, 3). The content is user-generated and connects users via its exchanges, making possible “many-to-many communications” (3). Viewed commonly at the opposite pole from social media, mass media (use synonymously with mainstream media) is defined as “institutions of society that use technical means of reproduction to disseminate communication. These include books, magazines, newspapers, radio and television” (43). These institutions construct, and control, a made-up reality that the public consumes, as presented in the influential work Manufacturing Consent - The Political Economy of Mass Media by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (40). The advent of social media broke away, even if it was at a superficial level, from this dominion of mainstream media (and consequently of ‘reality’). 

Unlike mass media, the predominance of user-generated content on this novel domain, which bypasses the layers of filters of traditional kind, makes information more reliable, or at the minimum less biased. Another crucial distinction between the two is the timing of dispatch: information on social media is more valuable because “communication [there] takes place in real time” (Zangger 2024, 53). Interestingly, nowadays images and videos often circulate first on social media platforms before later appearing in the news. An implication of this, which is rather crucial for activists, is the ability to set the tone of a movement’s public image and narrative before mainstream media is able to impose its own agenda. To its enthusiasts, this prompted a new wave of activism that resolved problems the traditional methods of dissidence dealt with: the ability to create an autonomously-determined narrative of the movement unfettered by media biases. This meant the possibility of creating a genuine movement free from the shackles of mainstream media. As Mark Pfeiffle, a former national security advisor for Gorge W. Bush wrote in 2009 regarding his suggestion for Twitter to win the Nobel Peace Prize that “without Twitter the people of Iran would not have felt empowered and confident to stand up for freedom and democracy” (Gladwell 2010). Furthermore, social media is built with the intention of enabling users' interaction in mind “through commenting, liking, and sharing” (Zangger 2024, 54) whereas traditional media keeps users participation to a minimum - passive consumption of news. Social movements, again, benefit from this feature by attracting evermore attention and involvement towards their cause. On a global scale of exposure the impact would be insurmountable. 

Social media and identity politics

Malcolm Gladwell points out the mounting commendation for social media’s role in popular movements, remarking that “where activists were once defined by their causes, they are now defined by their tools” (Gladwell 2010). This observation is critical for several reasons. In the first place, this means a movement becomes subordinated to where the activism takes place; in other words, it is how the movement is perceived in this space that is important and what the movement represents abstractly rather than its historical and contextual specificity. The Arab Spring movement, for instance, was more of a Western virtual reality experience of a revolution than anything else. Western scholars and experts, like Pfeiffle and James K. Glassman are fixated on perceiving social media as an indication of modernity, leading to claims like: “much like western societies, parts of Egyptian society are transforming away from traditional groups and towards more loosely structured ‘networked individualism’” (Aouragh 2012, 529). The duality of these praises are as follows: on the one hand, they mask the denunciation of traditional/hierarchical resistance groups like the Muslim Brotherhood; on the other hand, they reflect the desire of (Western) elites for social media to generate a “non-ideological generation” (Aouragh 2012, 529) distinguishable from ideologically-oriented movements of the past. To whitewash the importance of on-the-ground politics and insert “the internet corporations at the centre of analyses” means that lens through which the Arab Spring is recognized is on the basis of its possession (or lack thereof) of Western characteristics of modernity (Aouragh 2012, 529); thus, a genuine popular Arab movement is denied (Aouragh 2012, 529). For two, Gladwell’s comment paints a rather daunting question: if activism is “defined” by social media platforms, could that definition become a restriction and thus limit the genuinity of social movements existing in these spaces? Would a movement engendered on social media be manufactured from its inception? 

It is worth the space here to discuss further the relationship between social media and the new wave of non-ideological popular movements. The dominant postulation of the younger generations that movements of the past, which fought for materialistic demands and were grounded mostly in class alliances, are now “outdated, conservative and reactionary” induced the “possibility of creating new identities” that moved past these static group identifications (i.e. party, union, class) and their boxed ideologies (Aouragh 2012, 524). With that, the role of the individual becomes important when they are now in charge of their personal politics (Bennett 2012, 22). Over time, this phenomenon culminates into what is called identity politics. It makes up the essence of the new social movements that focus on identities like women, minorities and/or cause issues (i.e. antinuclear, environmental conservation, specific rights) (Bennett 2012, 21). The clearest declaration of the divorce between traditional ideologies and the youth was the Time Magazine person of 2006, which was “you”. The messaging was simple, yet resounding: empowered by social media, “individuals were increasingly on their own in changing societies” (21). Again in 2011, the Time’s Person of the Year was the anonymous “Protester,” taking inspiration from the cascades of social outrage that year: from the Arab Spring in Tahrir Square, to the Indignados in Madrid and the Occupy camps in the United States (22). Moreover, according to Bennett and Sergerberg (2011), identity politics have three core conditions: (1) a philosophy of diversity on the basis of toleration of different beliefs; (2) “crowd-sourced inclusive action frames (i.e. We are the 99%) that lower the barriers to identification;” (3) participation is rooted in expressing/sharing personal experiences and concerns. Social media as a space, which is a location that is abundant in varying perspectives and beliefs, and a tool, which allows for the creation of a “loosely tied social network” that eventually brings collective action, accommodates these conditions quite well (21). Because of such diverse identities coming together for a common cause, the collective action becomes individualized through their “openness to individual-level innovation aided by the clear avoidance of formal organization, leaders, collective identifications, divisive ideology, or hierarchy,” all of which social media platforms perfectly cater to (30). This is reflected in the patterns of political activism of the Occupy movement, which was scattered, lacked coordination (primarily due to the usage of social media instead of offline sites) and filled with inclusive identity slogans claiming “We are the 99%” (30). 

Why identity politics is not capable of producing genuine popular movements

Even if it is argued that there is an ideological element inherent in the popular movements of the 21st century, sociologist Doug McAdam posits that the key difference between movements before and after the rise of social media is not so much “ideological fervor” as it is “an applicant’s degree of personal connection” to the movement (Gladwell 2010). Take the Freedom Summer movement launched by American civil rights activists in June 1964. It was mandatory for volunteers to have a list of personal contacts, and those with friends involved in the same movement were more unlikely to drop out (Gladwell 2010). These relationships McAdam calls “strong-ties” are characteristic of high-risk activities, like those of the civil rights movement (Gladwell 2010). But this is identifiable in other high-risk activities like that of the Red Brigades, the Italian terrorist group of the 1970s and the mujahideen in Afghanistan, where 70% of recruits had at least one good friend in the group (Gladwell 2010). These examples go to show that acts of genuine dissidence require a level of tight knit connection among participants, something that popular movements nowadays simply do not possess (Gladwell 2010). This is not because there are no more social issues to fight for, or that people have run out of the desire for change. Instead, it is tied to how we organize popular movements on social media platforms that are designed for building a network of “weak ties” (Gladwell 2010). Simply put, social media allows users to connect with a wide group of people that are ultimately strangers. This is not inherently a bad thing as “our acquaintances…are our greatest source of new ideas and information” which social media appropriates to the fullest degree (Gladwell 2010). However, activism is not simply raising awareness; it constitutes a level of participation, dedication and sacrifice that weak ties can rarely suffice (Gladwell 2010). When a movement places itself in the field of cyberspace, what happens is the social networks will create a massive increase in participation; this is, of course, at the expense of high commitment and motivation; this is ideal for signatures of petitions or donations where a mass of individuals donating a few cents could raise a large sum of money. Thus, online activism is inherently disingenuous in the sense that it provides opportunities for people that are unmotivated to make real sacrifices to participate in a cause, allowing more people to express their shared frustration while making it “ harder for that expression to have any impact” (Gladwell 2010). This cannot be the mentality of a genuine popular movement that aims for systemic change! 

How identity politics are easily co-opted & become manufactured political outrage

The Occupy movement is a good case of how the a popular movement could be easily co-opted and turned into manufactured politics with a reformist resolution attached to it; that is to say, the Occupy movement demonstrates how identity politics, at its core, is not only susceptible but designed to allow harmonious existence either beside or within the hegemonic capitalist order. 

After months of widespread protests around the country, no longer unable to sideline the noise, those of the “1%” had to start discussing topics they had never touched upon before like inequality and fairness (Bennett 2012, 32). Critical is how they were able to do so without endorsing or acknowledging the protesters: from Washington to Europe, leaders advocated for "fairer" economic distribution as to leverage those that capitalism has left behind, while both Left and Right discourses remained squarely within capitalism’s logic of prosperity (32). As then president, Barack Obama’s role in the movement encapsulates well how the co-option occurs.  When he decided to address the political turmoil on home soil, it was with a “game-changing speech channeling Teddy Roosevelt” along with a 60 Minutes interview, all in the span of one week (32). In the speech, he echoed the idea of the 1% vs. the 99% that shaped the Occupy movement, stating: 

I’m here in Kansas to reaffirm my deep conviction that we’re greater together than we are on our own. I believe that this country succeeds when everyone gets a fair shot, when everyone does their fair share, when everyone plays by the same rules. These aren't Democratic values or Republican values. These aren’t 1% values or 99% values. They’re American values. And we have to reclaim them (32). 

It seemed, however, only Obama benefited from these “American values,” whose speech reached far and wide with approval. He continued to place these themes in his 2012 State of the Union Address and in his 2012 election speeches (32). All the meanwhile, across the Atlantic Ocean, the Center Right in Germany and France rallied for a “Robin Hood Tax on financial transactions” to curb unproductive speculations and  reduce inequalities between the rich and poor (32). Even through this summary it is somewhat visible how the elites were able to infiltrate the Occupy movement, take the scrutiny towards them and transform it into proposals and nice speeches promising a world better together. What was once a movement rooted in critiques of inequality and a call for economic democracy had now become a profitable election campaign.  

Yet, this co-option can be tracked more concretely. Bennett (2012, 33) modeled the "co-occurrence of the terms inequality and occupy, along with other terms chained to them” from September 2011 to February 2012. His findings show that by early 2012 (after Obama’s PR week in December 2011), there began to appear a divergence between the once interwoven narrative of ‘Occupy’ and ‘inequality,’ with large volumes of stories focused on the two frames separately (33, own emphasis). What Bennett illustrated was the hidden appropriation of popular movements by the elites without any real point of contact between the two groups. Obama’s speech no longer exists in between Occupy and inequality, but moves “into the center of the semantic inequality space” (Bennett). Like an occupation, Obama “even displaced Occupy Wall Street from its near exclusive position at the center of the inequality discourse space in the media” briefly (33). By mid-2012, Obama became a re-occurrent owner of the inequality discourse and the ideas associated with the Occupy movement (33-34). Other figures representing the 1% like Bill Gates, who gave a speech titled “A New Approach to Capitalism in the 21st Century,” and Klaus Schwab (CEO of World Economic Forum), who commented “Capitalism, in its current form, no longer fits the world around us” somehow slowly regained the spotlight and turned themselves into saviors of the problems they created (34). Thus, even when the Occupy movement was able to use social media to disrupt the flow of information of mass media and promote their cause to the extent of forcing political leaders to engage in these topics, the movement did not, and frankly could not have, pushed the discourse beyond the limits of capitalism. This is because the Occupy movement is drenched in identity politics, which emphasize on the idea of rational self-interest. An individual which acts rationally in her best interest is the basic unit of capitalist society. This creates self-consciousness as the common class in the political sphere of society. Under the banner of rational self interest, the Occupy movement, as other popular movements contain a ruthless and abstract disregard for foreign identities. These movements are thus incapable of overhauling the current order, since that would require a much more dialectical critique, requiring the acceptance of the class formation in society. 

What to do

The only logical conclusion that can be made here is this: Offline space is where genuine movements start. Nowhere is this truer than the Arab Spring movement, where the momentum within the movement was not hindered when the Internet was shut-down (activists later said that it was the shutting down of phone services which greatly affected ground activities) (Aouragh 2012, 528). Even more so, the occupation of Tahrir Square was the result of long weeks of daily meetings in cramped rooms and not due to Facebook activism (528). It must be recognized that social media platforms are just social networking tools; as such, they are useful as facilitators (raising awareness and disseminating real-time first hand information) to offline strategies (528). The network itself is real people intimately connected to a struggle outside of these virtual spaces (528). It cannot be overstated: what remains true and genuine to a social movement is the solidarity of its participants. Only through offline solidarity can a movement gain its legitimacy both in the eyes of the masses and by the hegemonic order. Thus, when a movement has an organized force online alone, without at least a parallel structure offline, the movement cannot be genuine and is greatly susceptible to co-option. 

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is undeniable the impact of technological advancements on the nature of social movements. It is harder to ignore the role that social media plays in expressing contemporary outrage. However, social media cannot take over the role of offline organization, something that is not only a feature of old social movements; it is the reason for the success and impact. To tackle social issues in the modern age is to both create a genuine movement using social media platforms, but at the same time recognizing the grave possibilities of co-option from the order we are trying to break away from. 

References

Aouragh, Miriyam. 2012. “Social Media, Mediation and the Arab Revolutions.” tripleC Communication Capitalism & Critique Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 10, no. 2 (5): 518-536. 10.31269/vol10iss2pp518-536.

Benneett, W. L., and Alexandra Segerberg. 2011. “Digital Media and the Personalization of Collective Action.” Information, Communication & Society 14 (6). 10.1080/1369118X.2011.579141.

Bennett, W. L. 2012. “The Personalization of Politics: Political Identity, Social Media, and Changing Patterns of Participation.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 644 (11): 20-39. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23316140.

Gladwell, Malcolm. 2010. “Small Change.” The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell.

Zangger, Eberhard. 2024. “From Memes to Marx: Social Media as the New Frontier of Ruling Class Dominance.”